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“Occident, lift your burqa!”1
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1. Title of a book by ERNEST MOUTOUSSAMY, OCCIDENT, ENLÈVE TA BURQA! (2010).
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INTRODUCTION

It is an extraordinary, and undoubtedly undeserved, honor for me to
give this year’s Herbert Bernstein Memorial lecture. Strange as it may seem,
I never met Herbert Bernstein. But I did meet his spirit at Duke. I am in many
ways his replacement at Duke. After he died unexpectedly, I came here to
teach one of his courses, Comparative Law. Herbert’s friends on the faculty
became my first friends here; his wife is a good friend. Like Herbert, I am
German; indeed, we both originate from the same city, Hamburg. And
Herbert Bernstein’s childhood story, retold by Paul Haagen in the memorial
issue of the Journal of Comparative and International Law,2 reminds me
closely of that of my own father, born six years after Herbert. Both grew up
in Hamburg, with fathers affected by the Nuremberg Laws, and critical of
the Nazi regime. Both Herbert and my father were sent away from Hamburg
in order to escape Allied bombing. Both retained, from this experience, a
keen interest in Germany’s dark times of anti-Semitism and fascism.
Those dark times are frequently invoked today, and often with regard
to Muslims, though with curious differences: for some, Muslims are the new
Nazis, brutal racist killers, a threat to the world. For others, Muslims are the
new Jews, victims of persecution and ostracization.
My topic today concerns one aspect of the ambivalent role of Muslims
as a perceived threat to, and as perceived victims of, Western law today: bans
of face veils, often (and inexactly) called burqa bans. Such bans may appear
strange to an American audience; as problematic as we may find burqas in
view of women’s rights, the idea that the state should ban them generally
strikes us as odd. Our neighbor Canada has long debated whether face veils
should be banned during the citizenship oath.3 Quebec very recently passed
legislation banning face veils for anyone giving or receiving a public
service;4 after protests, the government suggested the law should apply only
2. Paul H. Haagen, A Hamburg Childhood: The Early Life of Herbert Bernstein, 13 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 7, 7 (2003).
3. Face veils at citizenship ceremonies were banned in 2011. See Laura Payton, Face Veils Banned
for Citizenship Oaths, CBC NEWS, Dec. 12, 2011, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/face-veils-bannedfor-citizenship-oaths-1.1048750. A federal appeals court held the ban unlawful in 2015: Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration) v. Ishaq, 2015 FCA 194, http://decisions.fca-caf.gc.ca/fcacaf/decisions/en/120099/1/document.do. For discussion, see, e.g., Augustine S.J. Park, Racial
Nationalism and Representations of Citizenship: The Recalcitrant Alien, the Citizen of Convenience, and
the Fraudulent Citizen, 38 CAN. J. SOC. 579, 586–89 (2013); Jasmine Thomas, Only if She Shows Her
Face: Canadian Media Portrayals of the Niqab Ban during Citizenship Ceremonies, 47 CANADIAN
ETHNIC STUD. 187 (2015); Lara Mazurski, Exclusion in the Canadian context: Full-face veils as a barrier
to citizenship, 9 J. ARAB & MUSLIM MEDIA RES. 1, (2016).
4. Angelica Montgomery, What You Need to Know About Quebec’s Religious Neutrality
Legislation, CBC NEWS, Oct. 18, 2017, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/
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for moments of identification.5 The ban is currently under judicial review
and may well be struck down; a court has already suspended it.6 Here in the
United States, the closest we have come to such a ban was a bill submitted
in the legislature of Georgia, which was withdrawn after one day.7
In Europe, by contrast, face-veil bans have been adopted in several
countries and discussed in even more. These bans have generated a number
of critical analyses and doubtlessly will generate many more. Many such
analyses have taken the road that courts take. They have focused specifically
on aspects of human rights, in particular the right to religious freedom and
the right to gender equality. My analysis here will of course touch on these
questions, but my interest is a different one. It asks not so much whether the
bans are legal, and more what they symbolize.
Burqa wearers in Europe are exceedingly rare, and yet states spend a
disproportionate effort on regulating them. This discrepancy between
practical relevance and legislative effort is of high interest to the comparative
lawyer. Obviously, what is being regulated here is not an actual social
problem. Instead, legislation against face veils is symbolic, expressive.
Burqa bans are means by which the state can express something about its
understanding of the other and of itself. Burqa bans, I suggest, must be seen
as exercises in national identity-building. And such identity-building takes
place through differentiation and identification: in banning the burqa, the
state defines what it is not and what it is.8 The Western state “is not burqa,”
as indeed the German interior minister stated, with questionable grammar, in

montreal/burqa-niqab-national-assembly-quebec-liberal-government-stephanie-vallee-1.4357463.
5. Ashifa Kassam, Quebec Softens Face-Covering Ban Amid Criticism it Targets Muslims, THE
GUARDIAN, Oct. 24, 2017, 4:39 PM, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/24/quebec-softensface-cover-ban-muslim-women-niqab-burqa.
6. Paul Cherry, Quebec’s New Face-Covering Law Fails First Legal Challenge, MONTREAL
GAZETTE, Dec. 1, 2017, http://montrealgazette.com/news/quebecs-new-face-covering-law-fails-firstlegal-challenge.
7. House Bill 3 was pre-filed on November 15th, 2016 and withdrawn on November 16th. See
Rep. Jason Spencer Comments on Pre-filed Legislation, House Bill 3, GA. H.R. BLOG, Nov. 17, 2016,
http://www.house-press.com/?p=6058; Rep. Jason Spencer to Withdraw House Bill 3, GA. H.R. BLOG,
Nov. 17, 2016, http://www.house-press.com/?p=6060. See Lindsey Bever, After Outcry, Georgia
Lawmaker Abandons Bill That Would Have Banned Muslims from Wearing Veils, WASH. POST, Nov. 18,
2016,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2016/11/18/after-outcry-georgialawmaker-abandons-bill-that-would-have-banned-muslims-from-wearing-veils.
8. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, The Future of Political Autonomy—Democracy and Statehood
in a Time of Globalization, Europeanization, and Individualization [1998], in ERNST-WOLFGANG
BÖCKENFÖRDE, CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL THEORY—SELECTED WRITINGS 325, 330–32 (Mirjam
Künkler & Tine Stein eds., 2017).

MICHAELS FOR PUBLICATION (DO NOT DELETE)

216

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

4/11/2018 8:24 PM

[Vol 28:213

an attempt to define a German culture.9 The question remains: Then what is
it? I will take these questions in turn: what Islam does the Western state have
in mind when it bans face veils? And what, in turn, do such bans tell us about
the Western state?
In looking at these questions, I use an approach to comparative law that
I call postsecular comparative law and that I explain in more detail
elsewhere.10 Postsecular comparative law is a proposal for an expanded
comparative law that creates space for religious laws as objects of
comparison. In this focus on religious laws, postsecular comparative law can
help bring to the fore essential differences between state law and religious
law, but it can also demonstrate underappreciated similarities. It can show
how much religious law operates like state law, but also ways in which state
law ultimately operates as religious law. In this, postsecular comparative law
focuses not just on religious law; it also allows new and hopefully richer
understandings of the modern state.
It is with this perspective that I look at the clash between state law and
religious law that is reflected in face-veil bans.
II.

THE PHENOMENON OF EUROPEAN FACE-VEIL BANS

A. Face-Veil Bans as a New Development
For a long time, the fight against headscarves and other Islamic garb
was a concern mainly in Muslim-majority countries that hoped to modernize.
Turkey is perhaps the most famous example of a country in which a

9. Thomas de Maizière,“Wir sind nicht Burka”, BILD AM SONNTAG, Apr. 29, 2017,
http://www.bild.de/bild-plus/politik/inland/thomas-de-maiziere/leitkultur-fuer-deutschland-51509022.
The grammar is incorrect. It may reference a famous headline in Bild when German Cardinal Ratzinger
was elected Pope, reading “Wir sind Papst” (“we are pope”). And it expresses a forceful, and deeply
problematic, system of inclusion and exclusion, of identification and non-identification. “We” is not,
here, a contingent and internally plural community; it is a device to exclude.
The article was republished on the government’s website, with a different title, also in English: Thomas
de Maizière, A Leitkultur for Germany – What Exactly Does it Mean?, FED. MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR,
May 1, 2017, http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Interviews/EN/2017/namensartikel-bild.html.
The reference to the burqa is not the only implicit rejection of certain habits typically connected with
Islam. De Maizière, id., also emphasizes that “[t]o us there is no linkage between the concept of honour
and violence,” demanded that immigrants “must show respect in the way they interact with others and
accept the precedence of law over religion,” and alluded to the primacy of Christianity: “Religious
holidays are part of our calendar. Church spires are part of our landscapes. Our country is based on
Christian tradition.”
10. Ralf Michaels, Religiöse Rechte und Postsäkulare Rechtsvergleichung, in
ZUKUNFTSPERSPEKTIVEN DER RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 39–102 (Reinhard Zimmermann ed., Mohr
Siebeck 2016).
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headscarf ban was central to a specific project of modernization,11 but similar
developments occurred in many other areas of the world. Western countries,
by contrast, while concerned with headscarves in their colonies, remained
largely unconcerned with the regulation of Islamic garb in their home
countries, not least because it was rare.
This has changed; the West is now keenly interested. In 2009, President
Obama, in his now famous Cairo speech, suggested that “it is important for
Western countries to avoid impeding Muslim citizens from practicing
religion as they see fit—for instance, by dictating what clothes a Muslim
woman should wear.”12 He spoke not just to Egyptians but also to inhabitants
of Western countries. Islamic dress codes had indeed become an issue in the
West, especially in Europe. In the late 1980s, attention was directed to
headscarves, which were banned in specific contexts. Thus, students in
France and England were banned from schools for wearing headscarves.13 In
England, these decisions remained within the regulatory power of the
schools. In France, by contrast, the “affaire du foulard” led to a ban on
headscarves in schools that was later approved by the courts, including the
European Court of Human Rights.14 Other countries followed France’s lead,
although with varying levels of intensity and degree. In 2007, France
expanded its ban to include those delivering a public service.15 That ban too
was later upheld by the European Court of Human Rights.16
More recently, attention has turned away from headscarves to face
veils—veils that cover the entire face. One type of face veil is the niqab, a
veil originating in the Arab world that covers the whole face except for the
eyes. The other is the burqa, a whole body veil originating from Central Asia,
which covers the eyes with a grid. The niqab has long been an object of
orientalist fascination for European eyes.17 The burqa, by contrast, gained
11. ANNA C. KORTEWEG & GÖKÇE YURDAKUL, THE HEADSCARF DEBATES—CONFLICTS OF
NATIONAL BELONGING 57–95 (2014).
12. Barack Obama, Text: Obama’s Speech in Cairo, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html.
13. See CHRISTIAN JOPPKE, VEIL—MIRROR OF IDENTITY 27, 94–95 (2009).
14. See generally, JOHN R. BOWEN, WHY THE FRENCH DON’T LIKE HEADSCARVES—ISLAM, THE
STATE, AND PUBLIC SPACE (2007); KORTEWEG & YURDAKUL, supra note 11, at 15–56.
15. LE PREMIER MINISTRE, Circulaire no. 5209/SG, Apr. 13, 2007, http://www.legirel.cnrs.fr/
IMG/pdf/070413.pdf.
16. Ebrahimian v. France, (no. 64846/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=
001-159070.
17. See JUDY MABRO, VEILED HALF-TRUTHS: WESTERN TRAVELLERS’ PERCEPTION OF MIDDLE
EASTERN WOMEN (1991); see also Frantz Fanon, Algeria Unveiled, in DECOLONIZATION: PERSPECTIVES
FROM NOW AND THEN 42 (Prasenjit Duara ed., 2004) (originally in FRANTZ FANON, A DYING
COLONIALISM 35–49, 58–64 (1960)).
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attention in Europe as an unattractive and off-putting piece of clothing due
to its association with the Taliban reign in Afghanistan. When people speak
of “burqa” bans, rather than “niqab” or “face veil” bans, this is symptomatic
of an underlying presumption: what is being rejected here is an Islam that is
considered dangerous, close to terrorism. The term “burqa ban” is therefore
a loaded one; if I use it here, then I do so with this very deliberately in mind.18
Face-veil bans are different from headscarf bans in important ways.19
First, the face veil, unlike the headscarf, conceals the face and thus has more
than a mere symbolic-expressive function: it prevents full reciprocal
visibility. Second, the face veil, unlike the headscarf, is largely absent from
more recent European history; whereas Christians, not only nuns, wore a
headscarf until relatively recently, non-Muslim face veils have always been
rare.20 Third, unlike headscarf bans, face-veil bans affect a miniscule
minority of Muslim women.
Face veils and headscarves are also regulated differently. Where
headscarves are banned, such bans are always partial, limited to certain
specific situations (e.g., for students in school) or to specific offices (e.g., for
judges). By contrast, face veils are banned, at least in some countries, fully.
Women are thus banned from wearing face veils in general and
comprehensively. Whereas headscarf bans attempt to expel headscarves
from contexts that involve the state by preventing certain people, such as
government employees, from wearing them, face-veil bans expel face veils
from public life altogether: private individuals are forbidden from wearing
the regulated veil outside the home.
B. Face-Veil Bans in Legislation – An Overview
France was the first European country to ban the face-veil nationally.21
The French ban saw its origins in the 2008 affair of Madame M. Madame M
18. See, e.g., David Koussens, Sous l’affaire de la burqa . . . quel visage de la laïcité française?,
41 SOCIOLOGIE ET SOCIÉTÉS 327, 329.
19. See Patrick Weil, Headscarf versus Burqa—Two French Bans with Different Meanings, in
CONSTITUTIONAL SECULARISM IN AN AGE OF RELIGIOUS REVIVAL 195, 211 (Susanna Mancini & Michel
Rosenfeld eds., 2014). Weil was one of the promoters of the headscarf ban.
20. Nedad Memić, Gesichtsschleier in Europa: Zwischen Pflicht und Tradition, DER STANDARD,
Sep. 17, 2016, http://derstandard.at/2000044447166/Gesichtsschleier-in-Europa-Zwischen-Pflicht-undTradition; Bianca M. du Mortier, In Search Of The Origins Of The Huik: Did The Spanish Play A Part
In Its Introduction?, in ARTE NUEVO 64, 66–67 (Andrian J. Saez, ed., 2014),
http://doc.rero.ch/record/233043/files/Arte_nuevo_1_2014.pdf.;
LLOYD
LLEWELLYN-JONES,
APHRODITE’S TORTOISE: THE VEILED WOMAN OF ANCIENT GREECE (2003).
21. For the history, I draw especially on: Anne Fornerod, The Burqa Affair in France, in THE
BURQA AFFAIR ACROSS EUROPE—BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SPACE 59, (Alessandro Ferrari &
Sabrina Pastorelli eds. 2013).
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was a Moroccan woman living in France whose application for French
citizenship was denied by the authorities, at least in part because she wore a
face veil and thus demonstrated, in the government’s view, insufficient
assimilation to warrant citizenship. The Conseil d’Etat, France’s highest
court in administrative matters, upheld the refusal. The court agreed that
Madame M had adopted a radical practice of religion incompatible with
“essential values of French society.”22 The following year, the government
set up the Gérin commission, a fact-finding commission that held a vast
number of interviews with experts, including—this is France—a number of
philosophers. The commission suggested that face veils infringe on the
freedom and dignity of women, on gender equality and a mixed society, and
on social life and the common desire to live together, but stopped short of
recommending a legislative ban.23 Other institutions, notably the National
Advisory Commission on Human Rights and the Conseil d’Etat, expressed
doubts that a ban could be legally justified.24 Nonetheless, in 2010 the French
legislature passed an act banning face veils in public spaces.25 The law
imposed modest criminal penalties for women who wear them, and higher
fines for those who force them to do so.
Although it may have looked like a French eccentricity at the time, other
countries were already on the way to introducing their own bans. In
Belgium,26 some municipalities had banned face veils since 2004. In 2011,
22. CE, June 27, 2008, Rec. Lebon 286798; for discussion in English, see Anastasia Vakulenko,
Gender Equality as an Essential French Value: The Case of Mme M, 9 OXFORD HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV.
143, 143–54 (2009); Per-Erik Nilsson, Who is Madame M? Staking Out the Borders of Secular France,
in RELIGION AS A CATEGORY OF GOVERNANCE AND SOVEREIGNTY 21, 25–33 (Trevor Stack, Naomi R.
Goldenberg & Timothy Fitzgerald eds., 2015).
23. ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE, RAPPORT D’INFORMATION AU NOM DE LA MISSION D’INFORMATION
SUR LA PRATIQUE DU PORT DU VOILE INTÉGRAL SUR LE TERRITOIRE NATIONAL, Jan. 26, 2010,
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/pdf/rap-info/i2262.pdf; for a summary in English, see
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/france-veil.php.
24. National Advisory Commission on Human Rights, Opinion on Secularism, Official Gazette no.
0235 of Oct. 9 2013; Conseil d’Etat [CE] [highest administrative court] Report adopted by the General
Assembly of the Conseil d’Etat on Dec. 19, 2013 (Fr.).
25. Loi 2010-1192 du 11 Octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public,
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.], Oct. 12 2010, p. 18344.
26. Jogcum Vrielink, Saïka Ouad Chaib & Eva Brems, The Belgian ‘Burqa Ban’: Legal Aspects of
Local and General Prohibitions on Covering and Concealing One’s Face in Belgium, in THE BURQA
AFFAIR ACROSS EUROPE 143 (2013); see also Eva Brems et al., The Belgian ‘Burqa Ban’ Confronted
With Insider Realities, in THE EXPERIENCE OF FACE VEIL WEARERS IN EUROPE AND THE LAW 77, (Eva
Brems ed., 2014). Compare Eva Brems, Equality Problems in Multicultural Human Rights Claims: the
Example of the Belgian ‘Burqa Ban’, 38 SIM SPECIAL: EQUALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: NOTHING BUT
TROUBLE? 67, 74–78 (2015), available at http://sim.rebo.uu.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/
Brems_Equality-problems-in-multicultural-human-rights-claims.pdf, with Rob Widdershoven, Troubles
concerning the ‘burqa ban’: reflections from an outsider, 38 SIM SPECIAL: EQUALITY AND HUMAN
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the Belgian national legislature passed its own face-veil ban.27 The
discussion leading up to Belgium’s ban referred repeatedly to the one in
France, and included several of the same arguments the French had applied:
safety, the requirements of “living together,” and women’s rights.28
Somewhat surprisingly, unlike the French ban, the Belgian law criminalizes
only the wearing of the veil; it does not address those who might force a
woman to wear one.
Finally, in 2017, Austria followed the French and Belgian models to
pass a ban on face veils in public spaces and public buildings.29 Here, also,
punishment is directed only against those wearing the veil. The ban is
formulated in such general fashion that it was enforced, in its first weeks,
against a man wearing a shark mask, another man dressed up as a Lego Ninja
figure, and a woman wearing a scarf on a bicycle.30
In other countries, proposals for general national face-veil bans have so
far not been successful, though they still may be. Attempts for federal
legislation in Switzerland have not passed; a bill that passed the lower
chamber of Parliament in 2016 was rejected by the upper chamber.31
Proponents of a ban are now hoping for a referendum.32 A bill in Estonia that
was directed specifically against burqas and niqabs has been withdrawn.33
RIGHTS: NOTHING BUT TROUBLE? 87, 90–91 (2015) available at http://sim.rebo.uu.nl/wpcontent/uploads/2015/04/Widdershoven-Troubles-concerning-the-burqa-ban.pdf.
27. Loi visant à interdire le port de tout vêtement cachant totalement ou de manière principale le
visage du Juin 1, 2011, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.], July 13, 2011.
28. See Vrielink et. al., supra note 26, at 151–55.
29. ANTI-GESICHTSVERHÜLLUNGSGESETZ 2017 BUNDESGESETZBLATT I [BGBl I] No. 68/2017,
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblAuth/BGBLA_2017_I_68/BGBLA_2017_I_68.pdf
(Austria); cf. Lizzie Dearden, Austrian parliament passes burqa ban seeing Muslim women face £130
fines for wearing full-face veils, INDEPENDENT, May 18, 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/europe/austria-burqa-ban-parliament-fines-150-full-face-veils-muslim-islam-niqabs-publictransport-a7742981.html; see also BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR INNERES, VERBOT DER
GESICHTSVERHÜLLUNG TRAT AM 1. OKTOBER 2017 IN ÖSTERREICH IN KRAFT (2017),
www.bmi.gv.at/verhuellungsverbot.
For
critique,
see
Flora
Alvarado-Dupuy,
AntiGesichtsverhüllungsgesetz: Zwangzur Entschleierung, 2017 Juridikum—Zeitschrift Für Kritik, Recht,
Gesellschaft 152 (2017).
30. Chase Winter, Austria ‘burqa ban’: Police raid toy store over a Lego Ninja, USA TODAY, Oct.
21, 2017, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/10/21/austria-burqa-ban-police-raid-toystore-over-lego-ninja/787167001/.
31. Swiss Senate refuses nationwide burqa ban, LOCAL, Mar. 9, 2017, https://www.thelocal.ch/
20170309/swiss-senate-refuses-nationwide-burqa-ban.
32. Simon Hehli, Die Schweiz wird über das Burkaverbot abstimmen, NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG,
Sep. 13, 2017, https://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/die-schweiz-wird-ueber-das-burkaverbot-abstimmenld.1315989. The proposed text is available as Eidgenössische Volksinitiative ‘Ja zum Verhüllungsverbot,’
https://www.bk.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/vi/vis465t.html.
33. EKRE withdraws bill calling for face veil ban, ERR, Feb. 7, 2017, http://news.err.ee/120601/
ekre-withdraws-bill-calling-for-face-veil-ban.
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Similarly, attempts in Spain to ban face veils both nationally and in one
province (Catalonia) were unsuccessful.34 The Dutch government once
planned to introduce a general face veil-ban but did not.35 The Danish
government, by contrast, currently has plans for a ban.36
What does exist, in some countries, are regional bans. In Switzerland, a
referendum in the canton of Ticino led to a constitutional amendment
banning face veils in public places or buildings; implementing legislation
went into force in 2016.37 In Spain, several municipalities (most of them in
Catalonia) adopted bans,38 before the Spanish Supreme Court held them to
be unconstitutional.39 Regional bans exist also in Italy.40
Further, other European countries have banned face veils in certain
situations. Bulgaria recently legislated that face veils may not be worn in
Bulgaria’s central and local administrative institutions, schools, cultural
institutions, and places of public recreation, sports, and communications.41
Similarly, the lower house of the Dutch parliament voted in 2016 for a ban
on face veils in certain public places, including schools, hospitals,
government buildings, and public transport; the ban has not yet become

34. Robert Gould, Moors and Christians: Fear of Islam in Spanish Political Debates, in FEAR OF
MUSLIMS? INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON ISLAMOPHOBIA 191, 195–203, 206–08 (Douglas Pratt &
Rachel Woodlock eds., 2016).
35. Adriaan Overbeeke, Introducing a General Burqa Ban in the Netherlands, in THE BURQA
AFFAIR ACROSS EUROPE,supra note 21 at 101.
36. Denmark Poised to Ban Islamic Full-Face Veils, INDEPENDENT, Feb 10, 2018,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/denmark-ban-islamic-fullface-veils-france-belgiumburqa-niqab-hijab-a8197931.html.
37. Women reacted by replacing the face veil with a medicinal mouth protection, which the law
allows. Aug. 15, 2017, https://www.aargauerzeitung.ch/schweiz/so-umgehen-musliminnen-im-tessindas-burkaverbot-131612423.
38. See Augustín Motilla, The Burqa Affair in Spain: Legal Perspectives, in THE BURQA AFFAIR
ACROSS EUROPE, ,supra note 21 at 127.
39. See infra note 50.
40. Catherine Edwards, Italian Region Bans Women in Face Veils from Entering Hospitals, THE
LOCAL IT, Mar. 8, 2017, https://www.thelocal.it/20170308/italian-region-bans-veiled-women-fromentering-hospitals.
41. Siobhan Fenton, Bulgaria Imposes Burqa Ban—and Will Cut Benefits of Women Who Defy It,
INDEPENDENT, Oct. 1, 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/bulgaria-burka-banbenefits-cut-burkini-niqab-a7340601.html. For background, see Maya Kosseva & Iva Kyrukchieva,
Religious Dress Codes: The Bulgarian Case, in RELIGION IN PUBLIC SPACES 255 (Silvio Ferrari & Sabrina
Pastorelli eds. 2012).
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law.42 Norway plans a similar ban.43 And in Germany, to many people’s
surprise, Chancellor Merkel declared in December of 2016 that she wanted
to ban burqas insofar as is compatible with existing law.44 In consequence,
the federal legislator passed a law banning face veils for public servants and
for identification purposes.45 Bavaria passed a law that goes further,
expanding the prohibition on veils to public servants and allowing local
municipalities to pass event-specific bans.46
Europe’s approach to face veils is thus not unanimous and will not
likely be so in the near future. Recently, the European Peoples’ Party, the
biggest party in the European Parliament, proposed an EU-wide ban for face
veils.47 Given the significantly different attitudes espoused by different
member states, it is unlikely to succeed, at least for now.
C. Face-Veil Bans in the Courts
Not surprisingly, face-veil bans have been attacked in courts, both
national and supranational, as both conflicting with religious freedom and as
constituting religious discrimination. The success of such attacks has been
mixed. The constitutional courts in France (in 2010) and Belgium (in 2012)
both upheld their respective national bans;48 both courts required an

42. Harriet Agerholm, Dutch parliament approves partial burqa ban in public places,
INDEPENDENT, Nov. 29, 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/dutch-burqa-veil-banholland-votes-for-partial-restrictions-some-public-places-a7445656.html; for background, Adriaan
Overbeeke, Introducing a General Burqa Ban in the Netherlands, in THE BURQA AFFAIR ACROSS
EUROPE, ,supra note 21 at 101
43. Norway Plans to Ban Face Veils in Schools and Universities, NEW YORK TIMES, June 12, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/12/world/europe/norway-veil-burqa-schools.html.
44. Philip Oltermann, Angela Merkel endorses party’s call for partial ban on burqa and niqab,
THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 6, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/06/angela-merkel-cdupartial-ban-burqa-niqab-german.
45. Janina Lückoff, Das Burkaverbot läuft ins Leere, TAGESSCHAU, Apr. 28, 2017,
https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/burkaverbot-bundestag-103.html.
46. Gesetz über Verbote der Gesichtsverhüllung in Bayern, June 17, 2017, BAYERISCHES GESETZUND VERORDNUNGSBLATT [BAY GVBL] 362 (Bavaria) (Ger.), https://www.verkuendungbayern.de/gvbl/jahrgang:2017/heftnummer:12/seite:362.
47. Jon Stone, European Parliament’s biggest political group calls for EU-wide ban on Islamic
face veils, INDEPENDENT, Apr. 7, 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/islamic-veilburka-ban-face-european-peoples-party-manfred-weber-a7672606.html.
48. France: Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2010–613 DC (Loi
interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public), Oct. 7, 2010, http://www.conseilconstitutionnel.fr/decision/2010/2010-613-dc/decision-n-2010-613-dc-du-07-octobre-2010.49711.html
(Fr.); English translation available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/
root/bank/download/2010613DCen2010_613dc.pdf; for analysis see, e.g., Noemi Gal-Or, Is the Law
Empowering or Patronizing Women? The Dilemma in the French Burqa Decision as the Tip of the
Secular Law Iceberg, 6 RELIG. & HUMAN RIGHTS 315 (2011). Belgium: Cour constitutionnelle [CC]
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exception for veils within houses of worship.49 By contrast, the Spanish
Constitutional Tribunal, when striking down a municipal ban in 2011, upheld
principles of pluralism and emphasized that certain differences had to be
tolerated within society.50
Both the French and Belgian bans have been upheld by the European
Court of Human Rights. In 2014, the Grand Chamber of the European Court
of Human Rights addressed the French ban. Its decision provided a
comprehensive overview of developments in France and other European
countries. The Court expressed severe doubts about the ban but nonetheless
upheld it as lying within the member states’ “wide margin of appreciation in
deciding whether and to what extent a limitation of the right to manifest
one’s religion or beliefs is ‘necessary.’”51 Two Judges gave a partly
dissenting opinion, suggesting that the legislation had no legitimate aim and
was not proportional. When the Court reviewed the Belgian ban three years
later, it held itself bound by its earlier decision and upheld the Belgian ban
in two separate decisions.52 In the Belgian cases, the Court voiced its
concerns even more strongly than it had in reference to the French one, and
one concurring vote emphasized the narrowness of the holding. But the Court
did not substantively change its approach. Whether the Austrian law will be
challenged remains to be seen.
D. Assessment
It is striking to see how much energy is spent on a question that appears
to be of so little practical relevance (except for those affected). Headscarf
bans at least deal with a widespread phenomenon—since the Islamic revival,
the number of Muslim women wearing headscarves has grown
considerably.53 Niqabs, by contrast, are exceedingly rare in Europe, and
[Constitutional Court] decision no 145/2012, Dec 6, 2012, http://www.const-court.be/
public/f/2012/2012-145f.pdf (Belg.).
49. Conseil constitutionnel (Fr.), supra note 48, at no. 5. Cour constitutionnelle (Belg.), supra note
48, at no. B.30.
50. Tribunal Supremo, Sala de lo Contencioso-Administrativo Appeal no 4118/2011, Jdgmt of 14
Feb 2013, http://www.poderjudicial.es/stfls/SALA%20DE%20PRENSA/NOVEDADES/SentenciaUso%20burka-Lleida.pdf; English summary in 2 OX. J. L. & RELIG. 476, 476 (2013). Cf. Gould, supra
note 34, at 203–06 Agustín García Ureta, Signos Religiosos, Autonomía Municipal Y Derechos
Fundamentales: Comentarios Sobre La STS De 14 De Febrero De 2013 (Prohibicíon De Uso Del Velo
Integral), 191 REVISTA DE ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA 201 (2013).
51. S.A.S v. France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 291, 291129.
52. Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium (application No. 37798/13), July 11, 2017; Dakir v. Belgium
(application No. 4619/12), July 11, 2017.
53. See generally SABA MAHMOOD, POLITICS OF PIETY: THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL AND THE FEMINIST
SUBJECT (2005).
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burqas, which are the implied main target of most legislation, are almost
nonexistent.54 Indeed, few legislators outside France appear to have based
their legislation on reliable numbers, undoubtedly because such numbers
would hardly have justified legal measures.55 Assessments regarding the
number of those affected thus vary greatly, but one can confidently say that
the number of face-veil wearers in Europe is minuscule. England has perhaps
the largest number (though exact numbers appear unavailable) but no ban.
In France, an early report cited only 367 face-veil wearers in the country.56
In view of the low number, the French government commissioned a second
report, which tallied 1900 face-veil wearers, including 270 in France’s nonEuropean territories.57 A Danish study estimates there are about 150 niqab
wearers in Denmark.58 In Belgium, either 200 women wear a face veil or,
according to some, only 30.59 In Latvia the number is three.60 In Austria,
many assume that the country is home to 150 face veil wearers, but the
number is not confirmed and very doubtful.61 Germany is allegedly home to
300 women who wear a burqa, but the empirical basis for that number is
unclear.62 A journalist, trying to find actual cases, found only one—and that

54. See Nilufar Ahmed, So few Muslim women wear the burqa in Europe that banning it is a waste
of
time,
THE
CONVERSATION,
Aug.
30,
2017,
https://theconversation.com/
so-few-muslim-women-wear-the-burqa-in-europe-that-banning-it-is-a-waste-of-time-82957.
55. For broader critique of the untested empirical assumptions underlying the Belgian ban, see
Eva Brems et al., The Belgian ‘Burqa Ban’ Confronted with Insider Realities, in THE EXPERIENCES
OF FACE VEIL WEARERS IN EUROPE AND THE LAW 77 (Eva Brems ed., 2014) [hereinafter:
EXPERIENCES].
56. La loi et la burqa, LE MONDE, July 29, 2009, http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2009/07/29/
la-loi-et-la-burqa_1223753_3232.html.
57. Rapport d’Information No. 2262, Assemblée Nationale (2010) at 28f [hereinafter Gérin
Report].
58
Kate Østergaard, Margit Warburg & Brigitte Schepelern Johansen, Niqabis in Denmark: when
politicians ask for a qualitative and quantitative profile of a very small and elusive subculture, in
EXPERIENCES, supra note 55, at 42–76.
59. Belgian law makers pass burka ban, BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8652861.stm, Apr. 30,
2010. See also Loi contre le port de la burqa, 5 ans après: où en est-on?, ATLANTICO, Oct. 26, 2015,
http://www.atlantico.fr/decryptage/loi-contre-port-burqa-5-ans-apres-ou-en-est-on-denis-jacob2380275.html.
60. Richard Martyn-Hemphill, Latvia Wants to Ban Face Veils, for All 3 Women Who Wear Them,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/20/world/europe/latvia-face-veilsmuslims-immigration.html?_r=0.
61. Jan Michael Marchart & Werner Reisinger, Die ominösen 150 Burkas, WIENER ZEITUNG, Mar.
2, 2017, http://www.wienerzeitung.at/nachrichten/oesterreich/politik/871996_Die-ominoesen-150.html.
62. Adam Taylor, Germany’s potential burqa ban has a problem: Where are the burqas?, WASH.
POST, Dec. 6, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/08/19/germanyspotential-burqa-ban-has-a-problem-where-are-the-burqas.
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was a reporter who wore a burqa to go undercover.63 Among the public
servants within the scope of the recent German law, not a single one appears
to wear a face veil.
Legislators justify the ban with the argument that measures must be
taken before the phenomenon takes hold. Be that as it may, for now, this is
largely symbolic legislation—except, of course, for those women to whom
it does apply. And with regard to them, the legislation seems to have had
fairly little deterrent effect. The French law has been enforced, it appears,
with some frequency, including thirty-three times against the same woman.64
But the number of face-veil wearers has not gone down significantly.65
The legislation must thus be understood as symbolic. And this makes it
more, not less, fascinating to look at the justification given for it.
III. THE CONSTRUCTION OF ISLAMIC LAW
A. The Refusal to View the Face Veil as Religious
Is the face veil about Islam? Even those in favor of a ban do not agree,
and for good reason. If the face veil is viewed as Islamic, a ban triggers
concerns about fundamental rights, in particular freedom of religion and
freedom from religious discrimination. If, on the other hand, the face veil is
not viewed as representing Islam, it is not entirely clear why it should be
banned, when so many other forms of discrimination against women are not.
Some European legislators’ preferred rationale is that face veils are not
religious and therefore face-veil bans do not interfere with religious freedom.
The French ban is said to concern “the social or intangible public order,
rather than the principle of laïcité.”66 The Austrian ban is directed against
any veiling, regardless of whether it is religiously motivated.
Indeed, some argue that the face veil could not possibly be required by
Islam, because if they were, hundreds of millions of Muslim women

63. Fabien Köhler, Ich habe versucht, Burka-Trägerinnen in Deutschland zu finden, BENTO, Nov.
8, 2016, http://www.bento.de/politik/burka-in-deutschland-wie-viele-vollverschleierte-frauen-gibt-es-indeutschland-773270/.
64. Guillaume Stoll, La loi anti-burqa a 5 ans. Pour quel bilan?, L’OBS, Oct. 9, 2015,
http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/societe/20151009.OBS7366/la-loi-anti-burqa-a-5-ans-pour-quelbilan.html.
65. Loi contre le port de la burqa, 5 ans après: où en est-on?, ATLANTICO, Oct. 26, 2015,
http://www.atlantico.fr/decryptage/loi-contre-port-burqa-5-ans-apres-ou-en-est-on-denis-jacob2380275.html.
66. For example, the sponsor of the French bill emphasized “Jean-Paul Garraud, Report No. 2648
on the Bill No. 2520, prohibiting the concealing of the face in public,” French National Assembly, June
23, 2010.
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worldwide are in breach of their religious duties.67 These European
legislators reference Islamic theologians for their assessments that Islam
does not require a face veil.68
Those who claim the face veil is not religious posit two alternative
explanations for it that are sometimes used together. The first is that the face
veil is not religious but cultural. The Gérin report emphasized that face veils
predate Islam, and that French Muslims have only recently adopted them as
an import from the Middle East.69 As cultural dress, face veils should be
permissible to ban. We find here, in the law, the old debate about the
perceived conflict between feminism and multiculturalism: should the West
protect women from their indigenous culture, or should it tolerate cultures
that treat women differently than it does?70
Another explanation of the face veil is that it is not religious but
political. According to this view, the face veil is indeed representative of
Islam, but only of radical Islam. Radical Islam, in this reading, is not a
religious but a political movement aimed at toppling secular regimes.
Viewed as such, the face veil deserves as little protection as the swastika,
with which it is indeed sometimes compared.71 Political Islam can be viewed
as a threat to the Republic not because it is religious but because it is extreme.
Indeed, the argument that the face veil stands for political Islam is used as a
reason for its ban in a number of Muslim-majority countries. In Egypt, it is
even argued that the face veil is actually not Islamic but Jewish.72 And so, if
even these Muslim-majority countries ban it, so the argument goes, all the
more so can the Western state. It is typically overlooked in such arguments
that the role of political Islam in Muslim-majority countries is significantly
different than it is in Western ones.
67. Tomas Avenarius, Die Burka gehört verboten, SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Aug. 12, 2016,
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/streit-um-symbole-die-burka-gehoert-verboten-1.3118828.
68. Gérin Report, supra note 57, at 36ff.
69. Id. at 25ff.
70. See Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels & Annelise Riles, From Multiculturalism to Technique:
Feminism, Culture, and the Conflict of Laws Style, 64 STAN. L. REV. 589, 596–609 (2012).
71. See Paul Cliteur & Machteld Zee, The Burqa Challenge to Europe, 23 MIDDLE E. Q. 2, 6
(March 2016), available at http://www.meforum.org/meq/pdfs/5878.pdf. See also Islam Critic Ayaan
Hirsi Ali Says Burka ‘Like Wearing a Very Big Swastika’, YAHOO, Apr. 4, 2017,
https://au.news.yahoo.com/a/34907487/islam-critic-ayaan-hirsi-ali-says-burka-like-wearing-a-very-bigswastika/#page1.
72. Hend El-Behary, Parliament to Draft Law Banning Niqab in Government Institutions, Public
Places,
EGYPT
INDEPENDENT,
Mar.
7
,
2016,
4:47
PM,
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/parliament-draft-law-banning-niqab-government-institutionspublic-places; Siobhan Fenton, Egypt Drafts Bill to Ban Burqa and Islamic Veils in Public Places, THE
INDEPENDENT, Mar. 9, 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/egypt-drafts-bill-to-banniqab-veil-in-public-places-a6920701.html.
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Regardless of whether the face veil is cultural or political or both,
classifying it as nonreligious has an advantage: if the face veil is not
religious, then the woman who wears it cannot invoke freedom of religion to
do so. If she has been forced to wear it by family members, then the ban
provides her with protection. If she has freely chosen to wear it—as research
suggests many do73—then this choice is inherently suspicious, because it
shows that the woman is either against gender equality, or in favor of a
politically suspicious movement.
In drawing these distinctions, proponents of face-veil bans make two
important presuppositions that are questionable and shall be discussed in
turn. The first: religion on the one hand, and culture or politics on the other,
stand on opposite ends; the face veil can be only one or the other but not
both. The second: the face veil is either a religious requirement, or a matter
of personal choice, but not both. Both presuppositions are erroneous.
B. Culture and Politics vs. Religion
First, it is critical to examine the assumption that face veils are either
cultural and political, on the one hand, or religious, on the other. That
presupposes that we can neatly distinguish religion from culture and from
politics. Such a distinction is perhaps possible for Christianity, which can
indeed to some extent be viewed as distinct from both politics and culture.
When in the New Testament Jesus asks the faithful to give to Caesar what is
Caesar’s and to God what is God’s, the Bible lays the foundation for a
potential coexistence between a religion that deals with heavenly matters and
politics that deals with earthly ones. This distinction is radicalized later in
Protestantism, which turns religion into a private matter of faith, leaving not
only the realm of governance (politics) but also the realm of action (culture)
to other parts of society. Such a purely faith-based religion can indeed be
viewed as separate from both politics and culture.
But this distinction is peculiar to one religion—Christianity—and, in a
mirror image, to one specific state—the Western secular state. The
distinction has never been as easy for Islam, which did not undergo the same
separation between politics and religion that Christianity did in the West.74
In Islam, the face veil can be both, political and religious.

73. On the importance for human rights of studying people’s motivation in depth, see generally
Anastasia Vakulenko, ‘Islamic Headscarves’ and the European Convention on Human Rights: an
Intersectional Perspective, 16 SOC. AND LEGAL STUD. 183, (2007). For in-depth studies, see generally,
THE EXPERIENCES OF FACE VEIL WEARERS IN EUROPE AND THE LAW (Eva Brems ed., 2014).
74. See generally WAEL B. HALLAQ, AUTHORITY, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN ISLAMIC LAW
(2001); NOAH FELDMAN, THE FALL AND RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE (2008).
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The veil is certainly political, at least for many. The face veil as such
has come to serve, widely, as a symbol of a certain strand of political Islam.
This is, indeed, why it is banned in some Muslim-majority countries like
Egypt: it symbolizes a threat to the more moderate Islam that serves as the
foundation of the state. But this does not make the face veil non-religious.
Islam is traditionally, and remains in principle, a religion that claims to order
all of life, including the political and the cultural. It is not a religion based on
faith alone but instead one in which action is of crucial importance. Certain
actions are therefore not merely accidental to Islam; they are indispensable
elements. As a consequence, the distinction between religion on the one
hand, and politics on the other, cannot be made as easily. The fact that the
face veil is political does not imply that it is not religious: it is both of these
things.
That is not to say that every Muslim carries her religion into the political
realm. Islam has detailed rules for how believers should defer to secular rule
in states in which they are a minority. Nor is it to say that what is now often
called “political Islam” (and what is really a modern movement) represents
in any way an official Islamic position on politics. The point here is more
limited: the way we think about the distinction between religion and politics
is determined by the distinction between Christianity and the Western state;
it does not necessarily apply in the same way for Islam.
C. Religion vs. Choice?
Yet more problematic is the suggestion that Islam does not require
women to wear the veil and that it is therefore a matter not of religious
command but of individual choice. Of course, as a matter of human rights
the issue is irrelevant. Religious freedom is not confined to actions that are
required by some official religion. The law also protects religious
convictions when they are individually held, as long as they are sincere.
Resting on this point, the German Constitutional Court has required that a
woman’s decision to wear a headscarf be tolerated when it plausibly rests on
her perception that the religious requirement is binding.75 In October 2016,
this was upheld for teachers in preschools.76

75. Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) (Federal Constitutional Court), 1 BvR 471/10, 1 BvR
1181/10, Jan. 27, 2015, 138 BVerfGE 296, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/
Entscheidungen/DE/2015/01/rs20150127_1bvr047110.html.
76. BVerfG, 1 BvR 354/11, 18 Oct 2016, 2007 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 381,
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2016/10/rk20161018_1bvr03
5411.html.
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Even still, the claim that Islam does not require a face veil is troubling
because it is misleading. Although most Islamic scholars do not consider a
face veil to be required by Islam, a consensus does not exist.77 Indeed,
Muslim women in different parts of the world wear different types of veils,
including different types of face veils, depending on different interpretations
of the requirement. Such ambiguity is characteristic of religious laws in
general, and of Islam in particular. Most religions, unlike states, have no
processes for final decision. Nor is the content of Islam a matter of majority
decision. While great deference is given to the most respected experts of
Islamic law, at the end of the day, ambiguity remains. And Islam favors the
plurality of views. “Every mujtahid is correct,” the Prophet is reported to
have said.78
How then can the individual know what is required of her? One way,
perhaps the preferred one, is taqlid, or following: she should follow the
advice, or judgment, of a respected legal scholar. But this begs the question
what one should do when scholarly opinions differ. Complicating matters
further, Islamic law has a populist strand;79 taqlid is not the only way to
discover what is right. From this perspective, Islam requires each believer to
make an honest attempt to get to the right result through struggle—ijtihad.
Faced with unclear sources and different interpretations, every woman must
decide for herself whether she feels compelled to cover her face. Of course,
she may need to contend with external pressures—from her father, her
brothers, and the community—meaning that the choice is not always fully
free, whatever exactly that would mean. But in the end, the answer she gives
is her own.
Notably, her answer is not one of pure discretion. Islamic law is not
understood, in the liberal sense of law, as setting outer boundaries within
which a decision can be taken on extralegal criteria. Rather, Islamic law
requires the faithful to answer any questions on the basis of, in the spirit of,
and therefore ultimately as a continuation of, Islamic law. This is a crucial
point. The distinction that Western law draws between command and choice
becomes a largely meaningless distinction. Islam commands the woman to
choose for herself, meaning, to struggle to find the right response. And what
the woman chooses is not what she personally would like to do, but rather
77. See, e.g., Roberta Aluffi Beck-Peccoz, Burqa and Islam, in THE BURQA AFFAIR ACROSS
EUROPE, supra note 21, at 15. An easily accessible collection of the main Quranic passages is at The
Quran, REORIENTING THE VEIL, http://veil.unc.edu/religions/islam/quran/.
78. See,
e.g.,
Intisar
Rabb,
Ijtihād,
OXFORD
ISLAMIC
STUD.
ONLINE,
www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0354; Anver M. Emon, Ijtihad, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF ISLAMIC LAW (Anver M. Emon & Rumee Ahmed eds., 2018).
79. On this, see Wael B. Hallaq, What is Shari’a?, 12 Y.B. ISLAMIC & MIDDLE EASTERN L. 151
(2005).
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what she thinks to be the best and most adequate interpretation of the
requirements of Islam.
IV. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATE
In response to Islam, the state not only constructs the object it tries to
regulate, namely religion. The state also constructs itself. What the state is,
what it aims to be, can be viewed through the justifications it gives for a
regulation like a face-veil ban. Essentially, there are three types of
justifications for face-veil bans, and they reflect the three views of the face
veil described earlier: the veil is viewed as a risk for security, a violation of
female dignity and equality, and an impediment to the way in which people
live together.
For my purposes, this third justification is the most interesting one. The
European Convention of Human Rights allows restrictions on religious
freedom with regard to the requirements of democracy and society. The
claim is that a face veil stands in the way of “living together” and thereby,
indirectly, impedes the kind of society that the liberal Western state requires
and protects.80 Living together, it is said, requires society members’ ability
to see each another’s faces, to communicate not just orally but also visually.
This is an interesting argument. Living together is not, formally, a legal
term, and yet it is used for specific legal purposes. This is so especially after
the European Court of Human Rights approved the justification as a
legitimate reason to ban face veils in 2014.81 Since the European Court of
Human Rights approved of “living together” as a justification for a ban on
face veils, much confusion has ensued as to what the term was meant to mean
and how it can be defined in a meaningful way—a confusion that has made
its way even into dissenting votes in the ECHR itself.82 This confusion
justifies a somewhat more extended analysis into the origins and meaning of
the concept. Here, a perspective from postsecular comparative law is useful.
A. Living Together – A Puzzle
As concerns bans on veils, the idea of “living together” emerged first in
France. In 2004, President Chirac referred to the “desire to live together” to
justify a ban of veils in public schools.83 Later, the 2010 Gérin Report
80. Conseil Constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2010-613DC, Oct. 7, 2010,
Rec. 276 (Fr.).
81. S.A.S v. France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 291, 343.
82. See id. at 385 (S.A.S v. France dissent No. 9).
83. See BOWEN, supra note 14, at 158; Circulaire du 18 mai 2004 relative à la mise en oeuvre de
la loi n° 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou
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repeatedly used the term.84 And during hearings on the national ban, France’s
minister of justice explicitly invoked the idea of living together:
The will to live together depends, as we all know, on our capacity to
assemble around common values and a common destiny. This ‘living
together’ necessarily entails a refusal to withdraw to oneself, a refusal to
reject the other, which sustains communitarianism. Living together
supposes acceptance of the gaze of the other.85

Does the face veil prevent living together? Taken literally, this makes no
sense. Of course people can live together without seeing one another’s faces.
We conceal our faces when we ski, when we motorcycle, and when we
celebrate Carnival or Halloween.86 Banning all these activities seems bizarre,
as reports from Austria make clear.87
More importantly, if the veil is a necessary prerequisite for living
together with women who feel obliged to wear it in public, banning the face
veil, in fact, actually undermines living together. The Spanish Supreme
Court made this point forcefully:
In academic studies on the justification of this kind of prohibition, what
frequently stands out is the risk of a perverse effect that could follow: the
enclosing of the woman in her immediate familiar environment, if she
decides to prioritize her religious convictions over other considerations.
This could eventually lead to a result contrary to the objective of
integration in different social spaces, and in sum, instead of serving
elimination of discriminations, could contribute to their increase, if those
spaces are closed to the woman in question.88

Does the face veil at least stand in the way of a particular aspect of living
together, namely proper communication? This is the understanding of which
de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics, JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], May 22, 2004, p. 9033.
84. Gérin Report, supra note 57, at 119–122, 492, 512.
85. Déclaration de Mme Michèle Alliot-Marie, ministre de la justice et des libertés, sur les motifs
du projet de loi visant à interdire la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public, à Paris le 15 Septembre
2010, VIE PUBLIQUE, http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/103002026.html (translated by RM). The
original text is: La volonté de vivre ensemble dépend de notre capacité à nous rassembler autour des
valeurs communes et d’un destin partagé. Vivre ensemble entraîne le refus du repli sur soi et du rejet de
l’autre qu’exprime le communautarisme. Vivre ensemble suppose l’acceptation du regard de l’autre.
86. See S.A.S Judgment, supra note 51, at 385 (S.A.S dissent No. 9).
87. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
88. S.T.S., Feb. 14, 2013 (J.T.S., No. 4118/2011, p. 21) (Spain), supra note 50 (translated by RM).
The original text is: “en los estudios doctrinales sobre la justificación de una prohibición de tal tipo no es
infrecuente resaltar el riesgo del efecto perverso que pueda derivarse de la misma: el enclaustramiento de
la mujer en su entorno familiar inmediato, si decide anteponer a otras consideraciones sus convicciones
religiosas; lo que a la postre resultaría contrario al objetivo de integración en los diferentes espacios
sociales, y en suma, en vez de servir a la eliminación de discriminaciones, pudiera contribuir a
incrementarlas, si a la mujer concernida se le cierran esos espacios.” See also EUR. PARL. ASS., Resolution
1743—Islam, Islamism and Islamophobia in Europe, no. 17 (2010).
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the European Court of Human Rights approved. But this seems equally
unconvincing. We communicate quite often without seeing our counterpart’s
face, for example on the telephone.89 Women with a niqab have
communicated for centuries; it is not clear why this should be impossible.
Moreover, it is not clear why how we communicate should matter at all. As
the dissenting vote in the European Court of Human Rights makes clear,
there is also a right not to communicate.90 We have no duty to take off our
headphones in public, or to raise our eyes from our smartphones.
There is a third understanding of living together, and it is linked to a
philosophical justification: a reference to the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas
and his emphasis on face-to-face encounters.91 Levinas suggests, essentially,
that the Other comes to us not as an abstraction but as a concrete person with
a concrete face, and that this encounter immediately creates ethical
obligations for us. Defenders of face-veil bans deduce from this an obligation
for the other to show her face. They even cite Levinas in their favor:
You turn yourself toward the Other as toward an object when you see a
nose, eyes, a forehead, a chin, and you can describe them. The best way
of encountering the Other is not even to notice the color of his eyes! When
one observes the color of the eyes one is not in social relationship with the
Other. The relation with the face can surely be dominated by perception,
but what is specifically the face is what cannot be reduced to that.92

The Gérin Report suggests that this means that the face, animated by its
expressions, is a whole that cannot be reduced to one of its elements, so that
a niqab, which shows only the woman’s eyes, must be banned. But this use
of Levinas is a perversion of his argument. In reality, it appears clear that
Levinas meant the precise opposite: that the face cannot be reduced to its
physicality, and that it should therefore not be confined to those elements
that describe it. In speaking about the face, Levinas really meant that the
Other approaches us as a concrete and vulnerable person, not an abstract
entity. It is the vulnerability of the other person that makes an ethical demand

89. See also S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11 (2014) (joint partly dissent par. 9).
90. Id. at par. 8. See also Bijan Fateh-Moghadam, Ganzkörperverschleierung verbieten?, 7
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK [ZRP] 214, (2016).
91. Gérin Report, supra note 57, at 116–18. See also MICHAEL L. MORGAN, THE CAMBRIDGE
INTRODUCTION TO EMMANUEL LEVINAS 59ff. (2011) (featuring a helpful introduction Levinas’ ethical
theory of the face).
92. EMMANUEL LÉVINAS, ETHICS AND INFINITY, 85–86 (1985) (cited in Gérin Report, supra note
57, at 118 and in Stéphane Mechoulan, France Bans the Veil: What French Republicanism Has to Say
about It, 35 B.U. INT’L L.J. 223, 263 (2017)). See also Michel Erman, La burqa ou l’impossible
compromise, LE MONDE, July 11, 2009, http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2009/07/11/la-burqa-ou-limpossible-compromis_1217883_3232.html.
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on us. This suggests that the veiled woman, if indeed she is oppressed (as
ban supporters tend to argue), deserves our support, not our regulation.93
B. Living Together and the Nation
In order to properly understand what “living together” means, the
concept must be put in its historical context. When the French minister of
justice stated that “the will to live together depends . . . on our capacity to
assemble around common values and a common destiny,”94 she made a clear
implicit reference. This “desire to live together” is nothing less than Ernest
Renan’s answer, given more than 100 years prior, to the question, “what is a
nation?”95 In his words,
A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things that, in truth, are only
one, make up this soul, this spiritual principle. One of these lies in the past,
the other in the present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy
of memories; the other is the present consent, the desire to live together,
the will to validate the heritage that has been jointly received.96

The desire to live together is, thus, what makes the nation. Renan rejected,
forcefully, the contemporaneous German conception of a nation, which was
one of essence—a community of fate, a race. This could not work for France,
which based its nation on the Revolution and the regime that the people
themselves had created. As Renan said, “Ours is the politics of the right of
nations; yours is the politics of race. The division of humanity into races . . .
can only lead to wars of extermination, to ‘zoological’ wars.”97
In defining the nation as a “spiritual principle,” Renan focused on
mentality rather than biology, and in particular on a common tradition. As
he explained:
To have common glories in the past, and a common will in the present; to
93. See Sharon Todd, The “Veiling” Question: On the Demand for Visibility in Communicative
Encounters in Education, 2010 PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 349, 355–56; Chloe Patton, Defacing
Levinas: Vision, Veiling and the Ethics of Republican Citizenship in France, 20 SOCIAL IDENTITIES 186,
197 (2014); Maryam Borghée, VOILE INTÉGRAL EN FRANCE. SOCIOLOGIE D’UN PARADOXE 212–17
(2012); see also Gina Gustavsson, Romantic Reading of the French ›Burqa Ban‹: Liberty as SelfExpression and the Symbolism of Uncovered Faces in the French Debate on Full Veils, 2 CONFLUENCE
88, 100–03 (2015).
94. Déclaration de Mme Michèle Alliot-Marie, supra note 85.
95. Ernest Renan, Address at the Sorbonne: What is a Nation?, Mar. 11, 1882. The influence of
Renan on the concept of ‘living together’ is occasionally recognized but rarely analyzed further. See, e.g.,
Carla M. Zoethout, Secularism Stated, Rejected, and Reaffirmed: France, Italy, and Canada and the
Dilemmas of Multi-Religious Societies, 17 J. REL. & SOC. 1, 6 n.9 (2015); Bowen, supra note 14, at 158.
96. Renan, What is a Nation?, in ON THE NATION AND THE ‘JEWISH PEOPLE’ 37, 63 (Shlomo Sand
ed. 2010).
97. Robert D. Priest, Renan’s Race Problem, 58 HIST. J. 309, 313, n.21 (2015) (citing Ernest Renan,
Lettre à David Strauss (1871), LETTRES FRANÇAISES 2, 25–36 (1941)).
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have done great things together, and to seek to do so again, those are the
essential conditions for being a people. One loves in proportion to the
sacrifices to which one has consented, the evils that one has suffered.98

Renan’s alternative to a racial concept of nationhood was then one of
consent—a “daily plebiscite,” as he wrote elsewhere in the same text.99 But
in what way does the woman in a face veil not share this desire to live
together, not consent to the French nation? Madame M, for example, the
woman who was denied citizenship because of her face veil, expressed her
whole support for the French nation and yet was unable to convince the state
that it should give her citizenship.
C. The Role of Religion
In order to understand the full argument, it is necessary to look at
Renan’s definition in its broader context. Renan’s text on the nation did not
deal with religion, at least not explicitly—but much of his other writing did.
Having been brought up religiously, Renan later rejected belief in the
transcendental in favor of a keen interest in science. He rose to fame with a
book on the life of Jesus that was, unsurprisingly, controversial, as it
presented Jesus as a historical figure, not a theological object of study.100 His
approach to religions other than his own was similarly scientific. In an
address concerning Judaism, he suggested that it was a religion and not a
race, and therefore rejected racial antisemitism: “men should be judged not
by the blood flowing in their veins but rather by their moral and intellectual
value.”101
Renan was harsher on Islam, calling it, in a lecture entitled “Islam and
Science,” “the heaviest chain that humankind has ever borne” and deploring
“the inevitably narrow-mindedness of a true believer, of that kind of iron ring
around his head, making it absolutely closed to science, incapable of learning
anything or of opening itself up to any new idea.”102 In words that could be
written by opponents of Islam today, he wrote, emphatically, “Liberals who
defend Islam do not know it.”103 This is clearly islamophobic, and for that

98. Renan, supra note 96, at 64.
99. Id. at 64.
100. See generally ERNEST RENAN, LA VIE DE JÉSUS (1863). See also ROBERT D. PRIEST, THE
GOSPEL ACCORDING TO RENAN: READING, WRITING AND RELIGION IN 19TH CENTURY FRANCE 4–5 (2015).
101. Renan, supra note 96, at 69, 100.
102. Ernest Renan, Address at the Sorbonne: L’Islamisme et la science, Mar. 29, 1883, transcript
available at https://archive.org/details/lislamismeetlas00renagoog. Quotations are from the English
translation
by
S.P.
Ragep
at
https://www.mcgill.ca/islamicstudies/files/islamicstudies/
renan_islamism_cversion.pdf.
103. Id. at 17.

MICHAELS FOR PUBLICATION(DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

4/11/2018 8:24 PM

BANNING BURQAS

235

reason it is not surprising that Edward Said, in his book on orientalism, made
Renan one of his main foes.104 But Renan’s main foe here was not Islam
specifically, but religion in general:
Western theology has not been less of a persecutor than that of Islam.
Only, it did not succeed, it did not crush the modern spirit, as Islam
crushed the spirit of the countries that it conquered.105

The advantage of Christianity over Islam, according to Renan, was thus
not its strength but its weakness: it was unable to prevent the rise of
rationalism and science. These, for Renan, represented the future. Indeed,
Renan ended his essay on Islam and science with an enthusiastic (and not at
all pacifistic) praise for science tout court:
Science is the soul of a society, because science is reason. It creates
military superiority and industrial superiority. It will one day create social
superiority, I mean a state of society where the amount of justice that is
compatible with the essence of the universe will be procured.106

To Renan, then, the promise of modernity is not religious freedom but
freedom from religion altogether. A contemporary defendant of the face-veil
ban mirrors this thought when he argues that “an individual’s most
fundamental right is to free himself or herself from his or her origins.”107
And how does modern man overcome religion? Through the nation. A
famous passage in Renan’s lecture on the nation deals with the need of
forgetting, a collective amnesia:
The essence of a nation, however, is that all individuals have many things
in common, including that they have equally forgotten many things. No
French citizen knows whether he is Burgundian, Alan, Taifal or Visigoth;
every French citizen has to have forgotten St. Bartholomew’s night, or the

104. EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM 130ff. (2014). Said’s depiction of Renan has been criticized. See
DANIEL MARTIN VARISCO, READING ORIENTALISM: SAID AND THE UNSAID 111–15, 117–18 (2017). For
a different critique of Renan’s theory of Islam, see HICHEM DJAÏT, EUROPE AND ISLAM—CULTURES AND
MODERNITY 42ff. (1985). Renan’s critique had drawn immediate response in his own time. See CEMIL
AYDIN, THE POLITICS OF ANTI-WESTERNISM IN ASIA: VISIONS OF WORLD ORDER IN PAN 47ff. (2007);
Nelly Lahoud, Islamic responses to Europe at the Dawn of Colonialism, in WESTERN POLITICAL
THOUGHT IN DIALOGUE WITH ASIA 163, 170–78 (Takashi Shogimen & Cary J. Nederman eds., 2009);
York A. Norman, Disputing the “Iron Circle”: Renan, Afghani and Kemal on Islam, Science, and
Modernity, 22 J. WORLD HIST. 693, 694 (2011); Michelangelo Guida, Al-Afghāni and Namık Kemal’s
Replies to Ernest Renan: Two Anti-Westernist Works in the Formative Stage of Islamist Thought, 2
TURKISH J. POL. 57, 59–62 (2011). One important response to Renan is translated here: Sayyid Jamal alDin al-Afghani, Lecture on Teaching and Learning and Answer to Renan (transcript available at
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/book/islam-9780195154672/islam-9780195154672chapter-11).
105. Renan, supra note 102, at 18.
106. Id. at 23.
107. Pascal Bruckner, Unveiled—A Case for France’s Burqa Ban, 173 WORLD AFF. 61, 62 (2010).
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thirteenth-century massacres in the Midi.108

The odd formulation (“has to have forgotten”) points to a peculiarity that
Benedict Anderson emphasizes in an appendix to his book, Imagined
Communities:109 these events are not really forgotten; they are actually
remembered, recalled, in order to be forgotten. Forgetting these events rather
means leaving them behind, overcoming them. Importantly, these events that
every French citizen has to have forgotten have a peculiar nature. St.
Bartholomew’s night was a massacre committed by a Catholic mob against
Huguenots.110 The massacres in the Midi followed from the campaign by
Pope Innocent III against Catharism in Languedoc, a Christian sect.111 We
should suspect that Renan chose them for a reason. These events stand for
interreligious brutality; this is why they were, and are, remembered. Voltaire,
for example, referenced both events in his argument against religion.112
There can be little doubt that Renan was aware of this when he picked them
as examples.
This context helps explain what Renan had in mind when he talked
about these events as something every Frenchman “has to have forgotten.”
Anderson suggests that Renan mistakenly refers to the actors in the
massacres as fellow Frenchmen, when in reality their identity was grounded
more in their religion than in their common nationality.113 I think he gets the
argument exactly backwards. Presumably for Renan, it was precisely the
lack of a common national identity that served as root for interreligious
clashes. Religious groups fought each other to the death precisely because
they were not French. They viewed each other as different, as enemies,
because they belonged to different religions. It was only by becoming
French—secular, post-religious French that is—that they could leave these
times of brutality behind. This describes, then, in more precision, what the
French “have to have forgotten” in order to maintain internal peace: they
must have forgotten that they once defined their identity through their

108. Renan, supra note 96, at 47.
109. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES 199–201 (rev. ed. 2006); see also id. at xiv.
110. BARBARA DIEFENDORF, THE ST. BARTHOLOMEW’S DAY MASSACRE: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH
DOCUMENTS (2008).
111. M.D. COSTEN, THE CATHARS AND THE ALBIGENSIAN Crusade (1997); JONATHAN SUMPTION,
THE ALBIGENSIAN CRUSADE (2000).
112. See VOLTAIRE, THE HENRIADE (1723; English 1797); see also VOLTAIRE, DE LA CROISADE
CONTRE LES LANGUEDOCIENS (1756), English translation at http://www.midi-france.info/articles/
t_voltairecathars.htm. Cf. O. R. Taylor, Voltaire et la Saint-Barthélemy, 73 REVUE D’HISTOIRE
LITTÉRAIRE DE LA FRANCE 829 (1973).
113. Anderson, supra note 109, at 200–01.
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religious differences rather than through their national unity. They have to
have forgotten their once not being French.
Living together, in Renan’s view, is thus not just an empty formal
concept that could be filled by any way in which people live together. Rather,
living together is made possible by overcoming religion and its potential for
strife. The nation that is created through daily plebiscite is a nation that
rejects religion as the prime locus of identity.114 This idea of the nation makes
demands, first and foremost, from the state. The state that overcomes strife
and creates identity must be based on a nation that has overcome religion as
its identification. The state must be strongly secular, which the French idea
of laïcité indeed expresses. But this idea of the nation makes demands also
from religion. As Renan points out in his famous definition of laïcité, the
secular state he has in mind is “the State that is neutral among the religions,
tolerant toward all worship, and that forces the Church to obey it on this
capital point.”115 The church, in other words, has to be subjected to the state;
it is not an equal of the state but its subordinate. This reference to “the
Church” concerns, first and foremost, the Catholic Church, but it really
explains the role of all religions, including Islam.
D. Living Together and the Ban of Face Veils
Understanding this background and context allows us to finally draw
the connection between living together and the ban on the face veil. Renan’s
“desire to live together” does not come without conditions. Rather, it requires
“present-day consent,” and this consent, in turn, is consent to the common
“rich legacy of memories;” “to have suffered, enjoyed, and hoped
together.”116 Entering a nation, being part of a nation, requires saying yes to
this common legacy. The Jews, Renan suggests, “assimilated to different
nations, in harmony with diverse national units.”117 In other words, they gave
the required consent. In exchange for forfeiting the primacy of religion,118
they were welcomed in the French nation to “make an eminent contribution

114. See Michel Troper, Sovereignty and Laïcité, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2561, 2561–64 (2009).
115. ERNEST RENAN, RÉPONSE AU DISCOURS DE RÉCEPTION DE LOUIS PASTEUR À L’ACADÉMIE
FRANÇAISE, 27 Avril 1882, http://www.academie-francaise.fr/reponse-au-discours-de-reception-delouis-pasteur. (“l’État neutre entre les religions, tolérant pour tous les cultes et forçant l’Église à lui obéir
sur ce point capital”).
116. Renan, supra note 96, at 63–64.
117. Id. at 100.
118. Not, obviously, without any problems. The acceptance of Jews into French nationality came,
precisely, at the cost of giving up their separateness. See Jay R. Berkowitz, The Napoleonic Sanhedrin—
Halakhic Foundations and Rabbinical Legacy, 54 CCAR JOURNAL: A REFORM JEWISH QUARTERLY 1,
11–34 (2007).
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to the social progress of humanity.”119 In theory, Muslims could do the same.
But they would have to consent to forgetting St. Bartholomew; they would
have to leave behind the primacy of their religious identity. The Muslim
woman who wears a niqab or burqa, from this perspective, refuses this
particular consent. She refuses to leave her religious identity behind to
participate in the public. It is this act that excludes her from the French
nation.
Living together is therefore not merely a way of life or a social fact.
Living together is far more. Its function is to constitute the nation state that
can no longer be built on the grounds of race. Its mode is that of consent, a
communicative act. Its content is the agreement to share in the nation’s past
and future. And its substance is the very rationalism that has left religious
particularity behind. The Jew, the Christian, the moderate Muslim can agree
to that. The Muslim in a face veil cannot. Her wearing a face veil is
interpreted as a refusal to take part in the daily plebiscite.
Or so at least the French statute implies. After all, living together
emerges today no longer merely in the form of a statement of political
philosophy. Living together has become a legal category, one recognized
even by the European Court of Human Rights. This is a significant step: the
rejection of the face veil becomes definitional not merely of culture but of
the state and its laws. Of course, the Western state has always been
established through legal regulation. Sovereignty is in many regards a legal
concept. So is laïcité, the particular French version of the separation between
church and state, which is named as a principle in Art. 1 of the 1958
Constitution and whose content is laid down in a law from 1905.120 But that
legal definition of laïcité is formal and largely negative: it defines from what
the state and the church must, respectively, refrain. “Living together” is
something entirely different: a positive requirement from each individual, a
demand to actively consent to the state. This is the opposite of a human right;
it is a civil duty. The French citizen, it appears, owes the state more than just
compliance with its laws. She owes her daily consent. By requiring the
Muslim woman to take off her face veil, the state creates a positive duty for
her to express her belonging to the state.
It is quite remarkable, therefore, that the European Court of Human
Rights accepted the requirements of “living together” as a permissible
exception to religious freedom as guaranteed under the Convention of
Human Rights. The duty to consent to the state goes beyond the traditional
119. Renan, supra note 96, at 100.
120. For a quasi-official report on the state of laïcité in France one hundred years after this law, see
RÉFLEXIONS SUR LA LAÏCITÉ (2004), http://pmsimonin.fr/lexique/2008/laicite/laicite_conseil%20d’etat.
pdf.
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duties of the liberal state (complying with the law, paying taxes, perhaps
serving in the army). As the Court put it, the “[s]tate is seeking to protect a
principle of interaction between individuals, which in its view is essential for
the expression not only of pluralism, but also of tolerance and
broadmindedness without which there is no democratic society.”121 It is hard
to overlook the irony in this for the Muslim woman: tolerance and
broadmindedness are demanded from her, not afforded to her. She is the one
who is required to be tolerant and broadminded toward a form of secularism
that is not her own, and which presents itself as liberal and tolerant while
demonstrating its own limits. And her refusal to take off the niqab or burqa
is interpreted, whether she wants it to be or not, as the withholding of her
consent to the social contract.
E. Living Together in Other Countries
Renan’s living together should be an idea that could not travel, despite
attempts to copy it in various other countries.122 The French face-veil ban,
like its underlying concept of “living together,” is quintessentially French. It
rests not on generalizable ideas about the liberal state, or freedom of religion,
or even of the separation of church and state. Instead, it rests on a specific
French idea that expresses a very specific French history.
And indeed, to some limited extent the idea does not travel. In Spain,
the concept of living together—convivencia—has a specific Spanish
background as well: it describes the centuries of more or less peaceful living
together between Muslims and Christians in the Middle Ages.123 That idea
of peaceful coexistence may not match reality; it has long been romanticized,
and if current relations between the state and the Muslim minority are rife
with tensions, this is not a new thing. Nonetheless, what the concept of
convivencia invokes is tolerance between Islam and Christianity (and, by
extension, the secular state), not the restriction of religion. This may explain
why, in Spain, a similar argument of “living together” to support a face-veil
ban has not been successful, at least up until now. During discussions about
a national ban, one representative complained about the plagiarism implicit
in simple attempts to copy a solution from France.124 And while Spanish
121. See S.A.S Judgment, supra note 51, at no. 153.
122. MARIAN BURCHARDT ET. AL., THE JUDICIAL POLITICS OF ‘BURQA BANS’ IN BELGIUM AND
SPAIN – SOCIO-LEGAL FIELD DYNAMICS AND THE STANDARDIZATION OF JUSTIFICATORY REPERTOIRES
12–25 (2017).
123. See Kenneth Baxter Wolf, Convivencia in Medieval Spain: A Brief History of an Idea, 3
RELIGION COMPASS 72 (2009).
124. Presidencia del Excmo. Sr. D. Francesco Javier Rojo Garcia , IX Legislatura 4548 (2010)
(statement of Sen. Baigi Torras), translated in Gould, supra note 34, at 198.
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municipalities justified their bans with the needs of civility and living
together (civismo y convivencia),125 they were unsuccessful before the courts.
The Spanish Supreme Court suggested that “[t]he argument that the burqa
disturbs our Western culture lacks a convincing demonstration.”126 More
importantly, the Court noted that even if the burqa did create friction, it
would be the task of the state to “reconcile the interests of the diverse groups
and guarantee the respect to all faiths.”127 Religious plurality is thus a part of
the Spanish public order, not its enemy.128 Or, put differently, the idea of
living together places the burden of tolerance on the majority.
In Germany, remarkably, an idea parallel to France’s “living together”
has had some success. After the catastrophe of the Nazi regime, post-war
Germany attempted new definitions of the nation state that were closer to the
French ideal, without copying it. Germany’s version of a secular state gives
religion a stronger role in creating the conditions of “living together.” Ernst
Wolfgang Böckenförde, Germany’s most important constitutional scholar
after World War II, asked a question similar to Renan’s: “From where does
the liberal secularized state achieve, now and in the future, the level of
prelegal community and fundamental ethos that is indispensable for a
beneficial living together in a liberal order?”129 Renan’s answer, as discussed
earlier, was a common past and a common project for the future. Jürgen
Habermas’ answer, in turn, was constitutional patriotism, a secular idea
borrowed from the United States. Böckenförde’s own famous answer is more
ambivalent:
The liberal, secularized state draws its life from preconditions it cannot
itself guarantee. This is the great venture it has made for the sake of
liberty. On the one hand, as a liberal state it can only survive if the freedom
it grants to its citizens is regulated from within, out of the moral substance
of the individual and the homogeneity of society. On the other hand, it
cannot seek to guarantee these inner regulatory forces by its own efforts—
that is to say, with the instruments of legal coercion and authoritative
command—without abandoning its liberalness, and relapsing, on a
125. S.T.S., Feb. 6, 2013 (R.J. No. 4118/2011)(Spain), supra note 88.
126. Id. (“La realidad de esa perturbación de la tranquilidad en nuestra cultura occidental, a que
alude la sentencia, carece de una demostración convincente en cuanto simple constatación sociológica,
con lo que la base esencial sobre la que la sentencia se sustenta se desvanece.”).
127. Id. (citing Şahin v. Turkey, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. 5, 14 para. 106 (2004)).
128. In the European Court of Human Rights, a similar argument garnered only two dissenting votes:
“there is no right not to be shocked or provoked by different models of cultural or religious identity, even
those that are very distant from the traditional French and European lifestyle.”
129. Ernst Wolfgang Böckenförde, The Rise of the State as a Process of Secularization, in RELIGION,
LAW AND DEMOCRACY (Mirjam Künkler and Tine Stein eds., forthcoming 2018). The original German
text is Die Entstehung des Staates als Vorgang der Säkularisierung, in Böckenförde, Der säkularisierte
Staat (2007) 43(originally 1964).
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secularized level, into the very totalitarian claim it had lead away from
during the confessional civil wars.130

Böckenförde’s dictum, sometimes called a paradox, creates an ambiguous
role for religion. On one hand, the state must be secular: it cannot, as a liberal
state, be a religious state. On the other hand, because the state has no ethical
foundations of its own, it must find them somewhere in society. Böckenförde
has rejected suggestions that this foundation necessarily has to be
Christianity, though this is how the dictum is often applied. Even so,
Böckenförde does not confine religious freedom to Christianity: he was an
early and forceful opponent of headscarf bans. What this would mean for
face veils is less clear. At the same time, the “great wager” that the state
undertook, expresses, for him, a wager that is worth undergoing vis-à-vis
Christianity but not Islam: Böckenförde has rejected an EU membership for
Turkey, and emphasized that Muslims must remain a minority in
Germany.131
Finally, the concept of “living together” as a basis for a face-veil ban
was adopted in Belgium. The Belgian legislator rested its own ban “not
solely on considerations of public order, but more fundamentally on social
considerations that are, in the view of the authors of the ban, indispensable
for ‘living together’ in a society that is both emancipatory and protective of
the rights of all and of everyone.”132 This idea was obviously borrowed from
the French discourse, as were many of the other arguments put forth by the
Belgian legislator, down to the reference to Levinas.133 In many ways, the
Belgian legislative process mimicked the French one. This is quite
problematic. In a general sense, some idea of “living together” is of course
foundational to any nation, and not specific to any one country. By contrast,
the affirmative requirements of the French conception of “living together”
certainly are. The “heritage of shared glory and regrets,”134 the sacrifices to
which one has consented135 and that constitute the nation, are necessarily
different for different countries. In France they led to a particular kind of
130. Id. at 71 Emphasis in the original. Differently from the cited translation, I translate Wagnis as
venture.
131. See Ralf Michaels, Böckenförde Theorem and Burqa Bans, GERMAN L.J. (forthcoming 2018).
132. Thus the formulation of the Belgian Constitutional Court, supra note 48, under B.4.2.
133. See Chambre de Representates de Belgique [House of Representatives of Belgium], Proposition
de loi visant à interdire le port de tout vêtement cachant totalement ou de manière principale le visage,
Dec 1, 2009, http://www.lachambre.be/FLWB/PDF/52/2289/52K2289001.pdf, p. 6: (Au-delà de cet
aspect purement sécuritaire, les vêtements cachant totalement ou de manière principale le visage, nous
interpellent également au niveau de leur principe. Fondamentalement, tout comme Levinas, nous
estimons que c’est par le visage que se manifeste notre humanité.”).
134. Renan, supra note 95, at 64.
135. Id. at 64.
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secularism that defines itself in explicit opposition to religion in a way that
is coherent, even if it is objectionable. By contrast, Belgian history did not
create the same kind of secularism, nor the same kind of national unity.
Under Article 181 of the Belgian Constitution, wages and pensions of those
supplying religious services are paid by the state. The Belgian state is deeply
intermingled with Catholicism.136 And unlike France, the Belgian nation is a
recent foundation, and certainly not one in which internal strife, especially
between Flemish and Wallons, can be said to have been overcome in favor
of a common national identity. It is therefore less than convincing to base a
Belgian ban on face veils on the French conception of “living together.” The
European Court of Human Rights, in its decision upholding the Belgian ban,
felt bound by its earlier decision regarding the French ban.137 Given the
specific nature of the French concept of “living together” and the significant
differences between the two countries, this seems rather questionable.
V.

CONCLUSION

Face-veil bans stand in tension with the Western secular and liberal
state. Of course, neither religious freedom, nor general freedom, are granted
without limits—in Europe or in the United States. The state cannot tolerate
every act merely because it is religious, and the state feels justified to restrict
liberty where its own preservation is at stake. But the ban on face veils
appears implausible because it is so purely symbolic, so clearly ineffective
at fending off a real danger. Even if political Islam is viewed as a real risk
for the Western state, that danger lies with terrorists with bombs and
preachers with hate speech, not with women who wear a veil.
I have suggested that something else is going on: a self-identification of
the state, which identifies itself in opposition to the visible religion of Islam.
Face-veil bans reflect a Western state in perceived need of asserting its own
conception in defense against the other. In regulating clothes by banning the
face veil, the Western state demonstrates a remarkable lack of confidence. It
is therefore fruitful to consider how the state defines religion, and itself, and
what that demonstrates.
A. The Misconstruction of Islamic Law as a State
In banning the face veil, the state bans what it knows to be a religious
symbol. However, in its justification of the face-veil ban, the state
misconstrues Islam in two ways. First, it construes it as necessarily separate

136. See Stathis N. Kalyvas, Democracy and Religious Politics—Evidence from Belgium, 31 COMP.
POL. 292, 300 (1998).
137. Cf. Talal Asad, supra note 52.
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from both culture and politics: if it is cultural or political, it cannot be
religious. Second, it construes it as either requiring certain actions or
considering those actions a matter of individual choice, but not both.
I said earlier that these differentiations—between religion and
culture/politics, and between necessity and choice—are applicable only to
Christianity. But they are also characteristic not only of a religion but of the
state itself. It is state law that is, in the liberal state, separate from morality.
It is state law that is, under the rule of law, separate from politics. It is state
law that is, with an emphasis on legal positivism, separate from culture. And
of course it is state law—more precisely, liberal state law—that differentiates
between commands and individual choice. On the one hand, the state
governs the individual through commands. On the other hand, in the absence
of such commands, the state leaves the individual free to choose how to live
her life, within the limits set by the law. In a strange move, therefore, the
state re-conceptualizes Islam as though it were, or ought to be, like the state
itself. First, it turns Islam against its nature and into a state. Then, precisely
because Islam does not fit this model, it finds it wanting.
This misconstruction of Islam is not an accident. Rather, it is a
consequence of the process of secularization. By secularizing, the state
identified itself in opposition to the religion (especially Christianity) that it
sought to overcome. It has defined religion as that which happens in the
private sphere, and has assumed the monopoly of the public sphere. As a
consequence, when Islam enters the public sphere, the Western state can no
longer conceptualize it as religion. Instead, it conceptualizes it as something
aspiring to be a state. And as such it threatens the state’s sovereignty.
B. The Misconstruction of the State as a Religion
Remarkably, a similar misconstruction takes place on the other side of
the equation, too. The state, in banning the face veil, defines itself in a certain
way—as a liberal and secular state. But is it? At first sight, it seems so. The
state protects women from discrimination, while religion discriminates
against them. The state is liberal, while religion is oppressive. The state is
based on reason and argument, while religion is based on faith and
subjection.
A closer look demonstrates the fragility of this difference. In regulating
the face veil, the state reconstructs itself as though it were a religion. This
concerns, first, the question of liberalism. The claim is that Islam is
restrictive, whereas the Western state is liberal. But in the regulation of the
face veil, the opposite is the case. In order to protect women from a religious
dress code, the Western state imposes on them a secular dress code.
Conservative Islam orders women to wear a veil; the secular state orders
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them to take it off. Between the Islamic duty to dress and the Western duty
to undress, this looks like a struggle between two restrictive normative
systems, and the idea that what is being protected is women’s freedom
becomes hard to maintain. Banning a piece of clothing, freely worn, merely
to establish a certain way of living together, is the opposite of liberal.
Moreover, the state, in rejecting the face veil, ultimately invokes faith
and subjection just like the religion it seeks to regulate. Renan’s “daily
plebiscite” may look secular at first. But in reality, it is at heart a religious
act, comparable to the Christian profession of faith (or indeed the Islamic
submission to Allah). In the end, it appears, the state requires a quasireligious commitment from its citizens—and excommunicates those who do
not, in word and deed, express their willingness to follow. And it is the
wearer of the face veil who is made to bear the consequences.
C. Toward Postsecularism?
How can these misconceptions be overcome? This is not the place to
resolve this question. But some insights can be drawn.
On the one hand, the Western state ought to recognize Islam as a valid
actor in the public sphere, entitled to take part in political debate, and also
capable thereof. This is now done under the title of postsecular society.138
With Christianity, that is fairly easy, given that the Western state and the
Christian church have always coexisted and have arranged themselves with
a view to each other. Islam poses greater challenges to the state, and the face
veil is a symbol of these challenges. It is therefore not surprising that Islam
is often viewed only as a threat. But at the same time, it presents an
opportunity for a richer, more inclusive political dialogue within a pluralist
society.
On the other hand, the state must recognize the contingency of its own
position. The Western state is not neutral—both its secular and its liberal
character are fruits of its history.139 That does not make its law and ideals
indefensible—far from it. All that it means is that supporters of the Western
state have to actively make the case for their particular conception of
statehood. And they have to be willing to listen to alternative conceptions.
This is so because the state cannot automatically assert superiority of its own
position over those of other participants in political discourse without
betraying the very liberalism it espouses.140

138. See generally, Jürgen Habermas, Notes on Post-Secular Society, 25 NEW PERSP. Q. 17 (2008).
139. Cf. Michaels, supra note 10.
140. Cf. Böckenförde, supra note 129; Michaels, supra note 131.
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If these two steps are possible, we may achieve a true pluralism in which
positions are negotiated rather than asserted, and in which dialogue replaces
command and resistance. Instead of the fear and mistrust that is expressed in
face-veil bans, the West might lift the burqa over its own eyes to look Islam
in the eye. This would enable true communication, the true living together
that is expressed so frequently. That is, of course, a utopian idea. But utopia
is inherent both in religion and in the liberal concept of democracy. Perhaps
this similarity can serve as a stepping stone.

